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STATEMENT OF FINDINGS 
Petitioner hereby submits this petition for Re-Hearing in Accordance with Rule 3 5 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Court of Appeals has affirmed the Decision of Judge Hilder in the Protective order 
case on the following grounds; 
1. Court declined to review the issues of incomplete petition for Protective Order. 
2. Court concluded that statement of "Why, are you afraid I'm going to come and beat 
you up? Well Tm not" Fits the definition of Abuse under the cohabitant abuse act 
Appellate court concluded that "due to the couples litigious history, "a climate of 
hostility" existed in which a statement could be "reasonably construed.. as threats or 
intimidation" 
3. CourtRejcxtc^theResJudcataclaimsasnotvalid. Court also rejected the argument 
made to trial court that many of Petitioners claims were spurious and had been 
3 
rejected in previous hearings. This court then went on to state that "the record 
provides the grounds for us to doubt the accuracy of Clines assertions". In concluding 
that Respondent was not believable court used an incident related to permission to 
taking a car from aprevious case with KQlder. 
4. Court rejected both constitutional claims and due process claims, by stating the' 'cline 
was adequately prepared to respond". 
5. Finally Court of Appeals refused to hear Clines argument that court Trial Court 
should have dismissed Steve Wall from the proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
On the First Issue of the protective order not being properly being filled out 
Respondent argues that the issue is not irrelevant First of all Respondent did in feet argue 
thatthe petition was not fiUed out properly. (First Trial Transcripts pp 5) The issuealso 
involves jurisdiction of Juvenile Court. Issues of Jurisdiction can be raised for first time on 
appeal. Also if some one intentionally fails to disclose Jurisdiction of another court, then 
it is fraud upon title court. Petitioner in this case knew 1hat it needed to be done because 
this very issue has been argued in court before. Also when someone is deprived of basic 
liberty by fraud, then everything they do in getting themselves freed from the fraud is 
excusable.1 
1
 The Amistad 40 U.S. 518 (1841) 
On the issue of what constitutes abuse the statute is veiy clear that "Abuse means 
Intentionally or Knowingly causing or attempting to cause a ro 
or Intentionally or Knowingly placing a cohabitant in reasonable fear of imminent 
physicalharm. The statute is veiy clear that it has to be done intentionally. TrialCourt 
stated "well to some extent a threat is how something is reasonably perceived" (Second 
transcriptpp 19) The problem is that the Court has not exceeded what authority the 
legislator gave by iguoring the feet that how something is reasonably perceived is 
inelevant The issues are what are intended IfRespondent stated "why are you afraid I 
am going to come and Beat you up? Well I am not It is very clear that his intention was 
not to cause her fear, but to alleviate that fear that she may have because of Respondent 
just getting out of jail. The Supreme Court has stated that the interpretation ofa statute is 
a question of law. The Supreme Court has also stated that "we.. .look first to the... 
plaint language" recognizing that "our primary goal is to give effect to the legislatures 
intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Court has also stated that 
it is there obligation to avoid statutory constructions that "render some part of a provision 
nonsensical or absurd,"4 If trial court got to include how a person perceived a statement 
to be a threat, then everyone would be a candidate for a protective order just for saying to 
your wife, are you afraid"? If the wife then went down and filed a protective order, then 
2
 Parks v Utah Transit Authority 53 P.3d 473 (UT 2002) 
3
 Dowling v Bulling #20041008 (UT 2004) 
4
 Millet v. Clark Clinic Corp. 609 P.2d 934 (UT 1980) 
<; 
almost any speech after that becomes a crimM ad, and any property rights and rights to 
children become void able just for incidental running into cohabitant in grocery store If 
that is what the legislature intended then protective order statutes are in violation of First, 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. If Trial court is correct about it's 
reading of the statute, then once litigation starts between parties, that they are eligible for a 
protective order. This would be the case even if one party entrapped the otherpartyby 
filing false allegations in court documents and then asking for a protective order based 
solely upon the feet that there was litigation going on between parties. 
Appellate Court was also in error when it used its own judgment to detemiine that 
Cline may not have been truthful. On one hand the record that Court refers to, theissue 
of the taking of the car, Cline did in fact provide Trial Court a letter from Petitioner, 
during the Contempt hearing, that stated that she had given CMe permission to take car. 
So there is absolutely nothing about that statementthat concluded that Cline wasn't being 
truthful to the court. Trial court in fact only found that it had not allowed that document 
admitted into evidence and as such believed Petitioners subsequent statement that she 
had never givenRespondent permission totake car. So in fact both Court and Cline were 
correct, because Cline had a written doc 
Plaintiff! But the point is that there is nothing in that statement that would suggest that 
Cline was not being truthful. And even ifthere was, this court is in error to substitute its 
judgment of credibility for that of the Trial Court5 There is absolutely no evidence of 
any decisimonpartofTridCourttriatanytriir^Clhe On 
the contrary there was an incredible amount of evidence presented that Plaintiffwas the 
one that was not believable. 
The last issue has to do with constitutional rights being violated The issue of gender 
discrimination was preserved in trial record (pp 48 and 50) The issue of not being given 
proper way to present a defense is very relevant because ifCline had been given a chance 
to look at statutes involving qualifications for protective orders, maybe he could have re-
phrased his responses and outcome would have been different Also Court stating that 
issue was never raised in Trial Court is ridicules, for the reason that how can someone 
properly raise an issue when he is presented from researching it before his beingputin 
front of trial court That is the very point that Milton v Morris6 is trying to convey, which 
is that issues can not reasonably be expected to be raised by someone not trained in the 
law, if not given a proper chance to prepare his defense.. In addition a number of other 
due process violations have occurred In addition a number of due process violations 
occurred For example, Petitioner knowingly made ialse allegation ofchild abuse against 
Respondent (Second transcripts pp 10 see also trial record, pp 52) Several Federal Court 
have determined that using false allegations of abuse against a parent are basic Due 
5
 Willey v. Willey 951 P.2d 226 (UT 1997) 
6
 Milton v. Morris 767 F.2d 1443 (1985) 
7 
n 
Process rights. (Trial Record PP 52) Due Process rights are also violated when the 
Guardian ad Litem is allowed to participate in the proceedings.8 (Trial Record PP 52) 
Supreme Court concluded that this was plain error on part of trial court and should have 
been obvious. 
Court refused to Rule on Dismissal of Steve Wall. Courts reason was that there 
weren't citations to the record and no statement of the standard of review. The standard 
of review is clearly an error of law because Using wrong standard of evidence is to be 
reviewed as an error of law. Cline did in fact bring that very issue to the attention ofTrial 
Court, (pp 55) In addition Cline had already briefed the issue in Cline v. Hilder In order 
to save typing Cline simply referred Court of Appeals to the exact brief that had been 
presented to this court before. Given Clines status as a pro se litigant defending himself 
from lots of raise allegations it seemed reasonable that he use the exact brief that had been 
presented to this court before. The issue of Citations to the record is irrelevant because 
court reviewed the entire case and Cline hadn't provided any reference to the record 
Cline is not a trained attorney and the courts did not reject his brief when it was filed 
This is the second appeal Cline had written to this court and the other ones were 
reviewed, so it is obvious that citations to the record are not that big of a deal, unless 
reviewing court is just looking for a reason not to grant the relief requested. The only 
7
 Wilkinson v. Balsam 885 F. Supp 651 (1995 and 
Morris v. Dearborne 181 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 1999) 
8
 State v. Harrison 24 P.3d 936 (UT 2001) 
reason court would want to do that is that Clines arguments are 100% cori^ and court 
just does not want to disqualify an attorney because it may have long lasting affects on 
Mr. Walls ability to continue to practice law. These seams very odd to me because Utah 
Code gives district courts jurisdiction over attorney discipline.9 This Court has 
Jurisdiction to review District Courts actions in this type of case.' ° And Clearly the 
Supreme Court has authority over Attorney Discipline.11 Rule 8.3(a) clearly states that 
any attorney that has knowledge of another attorney violating the Rules of Professional 
Conduct has an obligation to report that Attorney to the bar. But in this case this court 
wants to just sweep it under the rug. Cline truly does not under stand that 
The entire Petition for Extraordinary Writ was included with the brief as an exhibit 
But Respondent will now include the information again for the courts benefit On Trial 
Record pp 48 -5 8, Respondent submitted a copy of a Motion to Amend Judgment and or 
Order to Judge Hfilder. Starting at pp 52, Respondent went to great length to present to 
Judge Hilderthe arguments that Steve needed to be disqualified. The summary of the 
argument is as follows: 
1. 1M maintains to Cbiirtw^ InPoly Software 
v. Yu Su, 880F. Supp 1847, Courts ruled on what it takes to disqualify opposing 
counsel for conflict "In order for a party wishing to disqualify opposing counsel 
9
 UCA 78-3-4(3) 
10
 UCA 78-3a-3h 
11
 UCA 78-2-4(3) 
o 
on grounds of former representation to demonstrate that opposing counsel 
previously had implied attorney client relationship with party. Under Utah Law, 
party must show that it submitted confidential information to lawyer and that it 
did so with the reasonable b e M t e t a (See 
Points ofAuthority for rest of cases and rulings that support this petition). Infact 
Nelson v. Green builder Inc. 823F. Supp. 1493, it states; Tarty establishes 
implied attorney-client relationship if it shows that it submitted confidential 
information to the lawyer and that is did so with the reasonable belief that lawyer 
was acting as parties attorney. On that basis the court already found enough 
reason to disqualify Steve. 
2. Typically Courts apply a very strict standard of proof when evaluating evidence 
to refute existence of client relationship and should resolve any doubt in favor of 
disquaMcatioa ( Z ^ If Steve is allowed to 
continue on mthe case, 1^1 wiU not be a Court Ruled that a 
disqualification would result in a significant interruption to the course of justice. 
Earl maintains that the fact that Steve didn't disqualify himselfearly on in ^ 
hasalreadyleadedtoa"sign^^ Ignoring 
that fact will not fix the issue, but will only allows the problem to continue to 
perpetuate its-self 
During the hearing on December 17,2003 Judge Mder set a trial date for March 
first and second A couple ofdays later, he sent a memo m 
motions for reconsideration or any other motions till the day of trial. At that point it will be 
two late to do anything about this issue., and irrevensible damage wiU be done to E^l and his 
chance for a fair trial. This is truly the only way to get justice at thispoint 
Poly Software v.YuSu, 880 F. Supp 1847 
[2] Party wishing to disqualify opposing counsel because of a foime^ 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, must demonstrate that a previous attorney-client relationship 
arose with the movingparty; that present U % ^ 
representation; and that attorney's present client's interest are materially adverse to movent 
[3] In order for a party wishing to disqualify opposing coims^ 
representation to demonstrate that opposing counsel previously had implied attorney client 
relationship with party. Under Utah Law, party must show that it submitted confidential 
information to lawyer and that it did so with the reasonable beHeftiiat lawyer was acting as 
party's attorney. 
Cole v.Raisoso 43 F3d 1373 
[26] Threshold question for court when ruling on motion to disqualify opposing counsel on 
ground of former representation is whether there was attorney client relationship that would 
11 
subject opposing counsel to ethical obligation of preserving confidential communications 
and fi>r these to have been attorney client relationship, party need not have executed a formal 
contract nor is existence of relationship dependent upon payment of fees; however, movent 
must show that it submitted confidential information to the opposing coimsel and did s^ 
the reasonable belief that counsel was acting as movant's attorney. 
[27] To protect cfient confidentiality, party moving for disqualification of opposing counsel 
on grounds of a former representation need not reveal the substance of its communication to 
counsel for this would defeat purpose of disqualification; usually showing of circumstances 
and subject of consultation will be enough to demonstrate whether information was 
confidential. 
Threshold of Reasonableness of Belief 
Nelson v. Green Builder Inc. 823 F. Supp. 1439 
[4] Party establishes implied attorney-client relationship if it shows that it submitted 
confidential information to the lawyer and that is did so with the reasonable belief that lawyer 
was acting as parties attorney. 
[5] To create attorney-client relationship it is not necessary that parties execute formal 
contract, or that relationship be dependent upon payment offees; fiduciary relationship may 
arrive solely from nature work performed and circumstances under which confidential 
information is divulged 
[6] Lawyer may not switch sides in substantially related representations; 
[7] Representation is substantially related to prior representation when lawyer could have 
obtained confidential information in first that would have been relevant in second 
[8] If substantial relationship is found between present and prior representations, it is 
unnecessary for former client to prove that lawyer actually received confidential information 
and used it against him or her, more-over, attorney or party need not divulge any conflicts to 
prove that they were revealed 
[9] Substantia relationship test for dis^ First, scopeof 
prior legal representation must be factually reconstructed; Second, court must determine 
whether it is reasonable to infer that confidential information allegedly given would have 
been given to lawyer representing client in prior matters; Third, court must decide whether 
that inibrmation is relevant to issues raised in litigation pending against former client 
[10] If^thecourtfMa^thattherepresentationare substantiaUy related, then presumption arises 
that lawyer received confidential information during his or her prior representation. [11] 
When a lawyer switches sides in litigation, presumption of shared confidences is irrefutable 
and thus disqualification is proper, absent consent o£ or waiver by former client 
pp. 1448 "The courts apply a very strict standard of proof when evaluation evidence offered 
to rebut the two presumptions of shared confidences on a motion for imputed 
disqualification This heavy rebuttal burden is satisfied only with "clear and effective" proof 
Moreover the court resolves any doubt at to the existence of and asserted conflict of interest in 
n 
fevorofdisqiiaMc^on'T^aUeNafl^ 
225)"". 
Dalrvmple v. Nat Bank and Trust Co. 615 F. Supp. 979 
[l]In determining whether attorney client relationship has been created, focus is on client; 
subjective belief that he is consulting a lawyer in his professional capacity, and on his intent to 
seek professional legal advice. 
[2]Todisqualifycoirnselonbasisofconfto 
is first necessary to show that attorney-client relationship exists or has existed between 
counsel and the party seeking disqualification, but not necessary that a strict contractual 
relationship exists, as relationship may be implied, and foremost among underlying concern 
is the possibility of attorneys disloyalty and breach of faith towards one who is previously 
entrusted him with confidences. 
[7] Inquire in cases in which disqualification of attorney brought on grounds of previous 
representation of opposingparty is whether attorney was inpositionto acquire confidences of 
his clients; the actual receipt of such confidential information is irrelevant 
[8] Implied attorney client relationship exists whenever lay party submits confidential 
information to an attorney whom he reasonably believes is acting to further his interests 
Kearns v. Fred Lavery/Porsche Audi Co, 573 F. 91 
[1] The attorney-client privilege attaches and one is considered a client, whenever one 
consults a lawyer with the view to obtaining professional legal services. 
[2] Attorney who represented defendant in patent infringement case and who had consulted 
with plaintiff in a suit against same patents was disqualified from further representation of 
defendants because he had received confidential information ronrerning the other, 
substantially related case; for attorney to continue his representation would have involved 
breach of his fiduciary obligation and would have undermined integrity of attorney client 
privilege, pp.95 "and in Schloetter v. Railoc oflndiana Inc., 546 F.2d 706 it was held; The 
basic policies underlying and judicially-compelled withdrawal of counsel because of 
potential conflicts of interest can be found in canons 4 and 9 of the ABA code of professional 
responsibility... Read together, the two cannons indicate that an attorney may be required to 
withdraw form the case where there exists even an appearance of a conflict of interest 
Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.6 (a) states "a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client 
except as stated in paragraph (b) unless the client consents after consultation." 
Rule 1.7 states "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of the client will be 
directly adverse to another client, unless: (l)the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and (2) Each Client consents 
after consultation. 
Rule 1.8 (b) states "AlawyersliaUnotuseinforrr^onidatingto 
to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation. 
Rule 1.9 states "a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter: (a) represent another person in the same or substantial factually related matter in 
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless 
the former client consents after consultation; or...". 
1.16 states that "a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has 
commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if, (aXl) the representation 
will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law". 
CONCLUSION 
In Conclusion, Court should re-consider its decision. The decision made in this case 
makes anyone who in getting a divorce eligible for a protective order no matter how well 
they are getting along. It is clear that is not the intent of out legislators, otherwise aprotective 
order would be issued as soon as either party filed for divorce. Steve Wall clearly should 
have been dismissed from this case at the very beginning. There is no doubt that if he had 
been dismissed that the entire divorce case would have gone much smoother. 
Respectfully Submittedthis/fr Day ofMay, 2005 
EarlCline 
Appellant (Pro Se) 
\c 
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